The Partnership: A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project
Mission Operating Plans -
Review
Timchenko, speaking for Working Group 1,
addressed that team's four major areas of responsibility - flight
operations, operations training, experiments, and spacecraft
compatibility. Planning the flight operations had been an exhausting
and time consuming exercise, for besides planning for the projected
15 July launch date, the flight planners had had to map out
alternative flight plans for a series of launch dates so as to be
prepared for a postponement in case of equipment failures or weather
problems. Mission planning analysts led by Kenneth A. Young and Oleg
Georgiyevich Sytin had to consider a host of variable factors with
each subsequent launch date. Lighting conditions at the Soviet and
American launch and recovery sites constrained their planning
considerably. Experiments keyed to the position of the sun or other
stellar objects had to be juggled around in each flight plan to make
certain that they would take place at the precise moment and place
required by the experiment plan. Each alternate launch date also
required its own tailored flight plan and trajectory computations, as
well as documents verified in both Russian and English.
Timchenko reported that the process of
planning for prime and alternate missions was completed. ASTP 40 301,
"Joint Crew Activities Plan," reflected their work. Furthermore, the
other groups had verified these flight plans for compatibility;
training exercises in the mockups and simulators had disclosed no
difficulties in flying the mission as outlined. Timchenko concluded
that there were no unresolved questions relating to flight procedures
or the mission timeline.8
He then turned to discussion of the control
centers interaction plan - how the two centers in Moscow and Houston
would operate during the mission. Over the many months of
negotiations, teams under M. P. Frank and F. C. Littleton and A. S.
Yeliseyev and Timchenko had codified several key agreements
concerning control of the mission. Flight operations were to be
directed by a flight director in each control center, with each side
having basic responsibility for its own spacecraft and crew. These
men would [290] converse with the
crews through the spacecraft communicator and with each other through
the Joint Flight Directors and their interpreters. Under both normal
and emergency conditions, these interpreters would play a key role in
the management of the mission. Once the mission was underway, the
burden of the responsibility would be on the shoulders of the flight
directors and the Joint Flight Directors. Lunney and Bushuyev would
act in a liaison and advisory role. To ensure the prompt resolution
of technical questions that might arise during the flight, each side
was to appoint a group of visiting specialists (the "consultative
group," as the Soviets called these teams) to be present in a support
staff room near the other country's control center.
George Low asked Timchenko about contingency
planning. Should an emergency call for a deviation from the
established flight plan, who would make the decision about the proper
corrective action to be taken? Timchenko replied that the flight
director would make the decision with preference being given to a
solution based upon procedures that had been worked out before the
flight. Low then inquired as to which side would make the decision
about an in-flight emergency. In the case of a problem involving crew
safety, Timchenko answered, the country whose men were in danger
could take unilateral action. For example, the endangered crew could
call for an undocking, which would be evaluated by that side's flight
director, who would notify the other crew and ground controllers of
his decision through the Joint Flight Director. Bushuyev interjected
at this point that there were plans for a number of specific types of
emergencies, the so-called "examined contingencies." Low probed
deeper and asked Timchenko what would happen in a case where there
were no communications with the ground. The Soviet group chairman
responded that such possibilities were specifically addressed in the
"Flight Plan Guidelines," ASTP 40 300, and the "Contingency Plan,"
ASTP 40 500. Going still further, Low inquired what would happen in
the event of an "unexamined contingency."
Flight Readiness Review, Moscow,
May 1975. Seated together, the five Soviet Working Group chairmen:
left to right, B. V. Nikitin, Yu. S. Dolgopolov, V. S. Syromyatnikov,
V. P. Legostayev, and V. A. Timchenko.
[291] Timchenko said that
the crews had been trained to make joint decisions on their own if
necessary. Bushuyev added that each commander had the prime
responsibility for his craft. Should a problem arise in Apollo,
Stafford would have the responsibility to solve it; in Soyuz, such a
decision would be Leonov's burden.9
Pursuing the issue of command further,
Timchenko indicated that one country's spacecraft could communicate
through the other country's ground stations to its own control
center. This arrangement especially broadened the amount of contact
time Moscow control would have with Soyuz since the ASTP trajectory
took the craft on a path away from many of the Soviet ground tracking
stations. In addition, communications between the centers would
consist of ten voice channels, two Teletype channels, two television
channels, as well as channels for retransmitting communications with
the crews and for transmitting facsimiles of document pages or
computer printouts. This complex system, worked out by the subgroup
on Intercontrol Center Coordination led by John H. Temple and Viktor
Dmitriyevich Blagov, had been tested in December 1974 and in March
and May 1975. These tests indicated that the system and the bilingual
personnel assigned to work on both sides as interpreters could work
satisfactorily under normal and emergency situations.10
In his report on crew and ground support
personnel training, Timchenko summarized the joint training sessions.
While the crew sessions had received considerable publicity, the
equally important work of the control center personnel had not. Teams
of flight controllers, visiting 'specialists, communications
technicians, and interpreters had worked in both the Moscow and
Houston control centers for ten-day familiarization exercises. The
American controllers completed their training in Moscow on 27
September 1974, and the Soviets finished their studies on 6 November
1974 in Houston. These sessions had been followed by joint
simulations, which not only provided an evaluation of the
communications but also gave all parties an opportunity to work
together in a condition similar to that of the mission. Problems and
equipment failures were introduced by the training leaders to give
the flight control teams experience in coping with emergency
situations. Timchenko indicated that the crews and flight controllers
had successfully completed their training and appeared to be ready
for the flight.11
In the final part of his report, Timchenko
summarized the preparations made for conducting the five joint
experiments. The requirements for each of these (microbial exchange,
zone-forming fungi, furnace systems, artificial solar eclipse, and
ultraviolet absorption) were documented in separate interacting
equipment documents, and the operating procedures and plans
[292] for each had been incorporated into the appropriate
onboard instructions documents. Those procedures and plans had been
verified and practiced by the crews in the mockups and simulators.
Only the ultraviolet absorption experiment had required further work
to perfect the flight maneuvers associated with it.12 Timchenko indicated that all the major tasks of
Working Group 1 had been completed. The only remaining work related
to solving some communications difficulties identified during the
simulation and to conducting the June joint simulation. Otherwise, he
reported that Group 1's personnel were ready to carry out their part
of the mission. Having completed his remarks, he turned the meeting
over to V. P. Legostayev, who addressed Working Group 2's
preparations.
8. "Apollo Soyuz Test
Project, Flight Readiness Review, May 1975," 25 May 1975, pp. WG-1-1
and WG-1-5; O. G. Sytin, "Ballistika EPAS" [ASTP trajectory
questions], in Soyuz i Apollon,
rasskazivayut sovetskie uchenie inzhineri i kosmonavti - chastniki
sovmestnikh rabot s amerikanskimi spetsialistami [Soyuz and Apollo, related by Soviet scientists,
engineers, and cosmonauts-participants of the joint work with
American specialists], Konstantin D. Bushuyev, ed. (Moscow, 1976),
pp. 77-99; and A. S. Yeliseyev and V. G. Kravets, "Upravlenie
poletom" [Flight control], in Soyuz i
Apollon, pp. 215-234.
9. ASTP notebook, kept
by Nicholson, for May-Nov. 1975.
10. "Apollo Soyuz Test
Project Flight Readiness Review, May 1975," 25 May 1975, pp. WG-1-12
and WG-1-13.
11. Ibid., pp. WG-1-22
and WG-1-26.
12. Ibid., pp. WG-1-27
to WG-1-40.
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